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Abstract. This paper proves the existence of a dichotomy which being
formally derived from the topological successiveness of ω∗-order leads to
the same absurdity of Zeno’s Dichotomy II. It also derives a contradictory
result from the first Zeno’s Dichotomy.
1. Introduction: Zeno’s Paradoxes and Modern Science
Zeno’s Paradoxes have interested philosophers of all times1 although until the
middle of the XIX century they were frequently considered as mere sophisms.
From that time, and particularly through the XX century, they became the
unending source of new philosophical, mathematical and physical discussion.
Authors as Hegel James, Russell, Whitehead or Bergson2 focused their atten-
tion on the challenging world of Zeno’s paradoxes. At the beginning of the
second half of the XX century the pioneering works of Black, Wisdom, Thom-
son, and Benacerraf3 introduced a new way of discussing the possibilities of
performing an actual infinity of actions in a finite time (a performance involved
in most of Zeno’s paradoxes). I refer to Supertask Theory. In fact, infinity
machines, or supermachines, are our modern Achilles substitutes. A superma-
chine is a theoretical device supposedly capable of performing countably many
actions in a finite interval of time. The possibilities of performing an uncount-
able infinity of actions were ruled out by P. Clark and S. Read, for which they
made use of Cantor’s argument on the impossibility of dividing a real inter-
val into uncountably many adjacent parts.4 Although supertasks have also
1See [14], [15], [83], [73], [47], [84], [25] or [56] for historical background.
2[43], [48], [72], [86], [87], [9], [10].
3[12], [88], [79], [80], [8].
4[23].
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been examined from the perspective of nonstandard5 analysis, as far as I know
the possibilities to perform an hypertask along an hyperreal interval of time
have not been discussed, although finite hyperreal intervals can be divided into
hypercountably many successive infinitesimal intervals, the so called hyperfi-
nite partitions.6 Supertask theory has finally turned its attention, particularly
from the last decade of the XX century, towards the discussion of the physical
plausibility of supertasks as well as on the implications of supertasks in the
physical world including relativistic and quantum mechanics perspectives.7
In the second half of the XX century, several solutions to some of Zeno’s
paradoxes have been proposed. Most of those solutions were found in the
context of new branches of mathematics as Cantor’s transfinite arithmetic,
topology, measure theory and more recently internal set theory8 (a branch of
nonstandard analysis). It is also worth noting the solutions proposed by P.
Lynds9 within a classical and quantum mechanics framework Some of these
solutions, however, have been contested. And in most of cases the proposed
solutions do not explain where Zeno’s arguments fail. Moreover, some of the
proposed solutions gave rise to a new collection of problems so exciting as
Zeno’s paradoxes.10
The four most famous Zeno’s paradoxes are usually regarded as arguments
against motion11 be it performed in a continuous or in a discontinuous world.
Achilles and the Tortoise and the Dichotomy in the continuous case, the Sta-
dium and the Arrow in the discontinuous one. The paradoxes of the second
case (together with the paradox of Plurality) are more difficult to solve, if a
solution exists after all, particularly in a quantum spacetime framework. Most
of the proposed solutions to Zeno’s paradoxes are, in effect, solutions to the
paradoxes of the first group or to the second one in a dense and continuous
spacetime framework. This situation is very significant taking into account the
increasing number of contemporary physical theories suggesting the quantum
5[58], [57], [1], [54].
6[77], [34], [50], [44], etc.
7[69], [63], [67], [73], [39], [41], [40], [64], [65], [31], [66], [61], [2], [3], [68], [85], [45], [29],
[30], [28], [74].
8[37], [38], [91], [39], [41], [40], [58], [57].
9[52], [53].
10[62], [1], [67], [73], [47] [74].
11[4], [38], [42], [24], [73] etc.
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nature of spacetime, as for instance superstring theory, loop quantum gravity,
quantum computation theory, or black hole thermodynamics.12 Will physics
(the science of change) finally meet the problem of change (whose insolvabil-
ity motivated Zeno’s argument) at this quantum level13? Is the problem of
Change really inconsistent as some authors14 have defended? These are in fact
two intriguing and still unsolved questions related to Zeno’s arguments.15
2. Zeno’s paradoxes and ω-order
Not less intriguing, though for different reasons, is the fact that one immedi-
ately perceives when examining the contemporary discussions on Zeno’s para-
doxes. Surprisingly, the Axiom of Infinity is never involved in such discussions.
Zeno’s arguments have never been used to question the Axiom of Infinity, as if
the existence of actual infinite totalities were beyond any doubt.16 Gru¨nbaum,
for instance, proposed that if it were the case that from modern kinematics
together with the denseness postulate a false zenonian conclusion could be
formally derived, then we would have to replace current kinematics by other
mechanical theory.17 Anything but questioning the hypothesis of the actual
infinity from which the involved topological denseness derives. And this in
spite of the lack of evidence of that hypothesis, which is even rejected by some
schools of contemporary mathematics as constructivism (among whose precur-
sors we find scholars as Newton, Fermat or Euler18) and by some XX century
thinkers of the intellectual stature of Poincare´ or Wittgenstein.19
In the first half of the XIX century Bernard Bolzano, and in the second one
Richard Dedekind, tried unsuccessfully20 to prove the existence of infinite to-
talities.21 For his part, G. Cantor, the founder of transfinite mathematics,
simply took it for granted the existence of such totalities. Thus, in §6 of his
famous Beitra¨ge (pp. 103-104 of the English translation) we can read:
12[35], [36], [81], [32], [75], [5], [76], [78], [6], [51], [6], [78].
13[7].
14[59], [60].
15[62].
16[49].
17[38, page 39].
18[55].
19[70], [89].
20Their respective proofs were compatible with the potential infinity..
21[13], [27].
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The first example of a transfinite set is given by the totality of
finite cardinals.
although, as could be expected, he gave no proof on the the existence of that
totality. In accordance with his profound theological platonism, Cantor was
firmly convinced of the actual existence of complete infinite totalities.22 He
never explicitly declared the hypothetical nature of his infinitist assertions (at
least not in his most relevant works on the transfinite.23 He even tried to prove
the existence of actual infinities (quoted in [71], p. 3, from [19], p. 404):
... in truth the potential infinite has only a borrowed reality,
insofar as potentially infinite concept always points towards a
logically prior actually infinite concept whose existence it de-
pends on.
Evidently this is not a formal proof but a personal belief. Cantor’s infinite
totality is isomorph to the set N of natural numbers and then his implicit
assumption on the existence of that complete totality is equivalent to our
modern Axiom of Infinity.
The (assumed) infinite totality of finite cardinals led Cantor to the essential
notion of ω-order (Beitra¨ge, p. 115 [20]):
By ω we understand the type of a well ordered aggregate:
(e1, e2, . . . , eν , . . . )
in which:
eν ≺ eν+1
and where ν represents all finite cardinal numbers in turn.
Cantor then defined the notion of fundamental series of ordinals of which he
proved the existence of a limit (Beitra¨ge, Theorem §14 I). This limit plays a
capital role in the proofs of the following 10 theorems in Beitra¨ge §15 the last
of which is the fundamental theorem K-15 stating that every ordinal of the sec-
ond class (transfinite) is either the result of increasing by one the next smaller
ordinal (ordinals of the first kind), or the limit of a fundamental increasing se-
quence of ordinals (ordinals of the second kind). Cantor construction of trans-
finite ordinals, from ω to the ǫ-numbers of the second number class, strongly
22[26].
23[17], [18], [16], [21], [22].
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depends on Theorem K-15. The imposing cantorian edifice was really founded
on that theorem. And that theorem, in turn, depends on the hypothetical
existence of a complete infinite totality: that of the finite cardinal numbers
(Axiom of Infinity in modern terms), which is anything but selfevident.
In modern terms we say a sequence is ω-ordered if it has a first element and
each element has an immediate successor. Similarly, a sequence is ω∗-orde-
red if it has a last element and each element has an immediate predecessor.
Evidently, both type of ordering are intimately related to Zeno’s Dichotomies,
although surprisingly, the analysis of Zeno’s arguments as formal consequences
of ω-order remains still undone. For some unknown reasons, it seems we are not
interested in analyzing the consistency of the hypothetical existence of actual
complete infinite totalities. And this in spite of the enormous problems the
actual infinity poses to experimental sciences as physics (recall for example the
problems of renormalization in elementary particle physics24). The discussion
that follows is just oriented in that direction. Its main objective is to analyze
Zeno’s Dichotomies I and II from the perspective of ω-order and ω∗-order
respectively.
3. The aleph-zero or zero dichotomy
In what follows, and for the sake of clarity, I will consider a canonical version
of the famous Achilles’ race whose logical impossibility Zeno claimed. In fact,
Achilles will be considered as a single mass point moving rightwards along the
X axis, from point -1 to point 1, at a finite velocity v. In the place of the
uncountable and densely ordered sequence of points within the real interval
[−1, 1] we will only consider the ω∗-ordered sequence of points:
. . . ,
1
24
,
1
23
,
1
22
,
1
2
, 1 (1)
all of which Achilles must successively traverse in order to reach point 1 from
the starting point -1. In fact, this denumerable sequence of points (Z∗-points
according to classical Vlastos’ terminology25) is not densely by successively
ordered, which means that between any two successive Z∗-points no other Z∗-
point exists. In consequence, and at a finite velocity, Z∗-points can only be
traversed in a successive way: one after the other. Assume now Achilles is just
on the point 0 at the precise instant t0. According to classic mechanics he will
24[33], [46], [35], [90], [36].
25[82].
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reach point 1 just at26 t1 = t0 + 1/v. But before reaching his goal, he has to
successively traverse the controversial Z∗-points. We will focus our attention
just on the way Achilles performs such a traversal. For this, let fz∗(t) be the
number of Z∗-points Achilles has traversed at the precise instant t, being t any
instant within the closed real interval [t0, t1]. It is quite clear that fz∗(t0) = 0
because at t0 Achilles is just on point 0. For any other instant t in [t0, t1]
Achilles has already passed over countably many Z∗-points, for if there were
an instant t in [t0, t1] at which Achilles were passed only over a finite number
n > 0 of Z∗-points, these n Z∗-points would have to be the impossible firsts n
points of an ω∗-ordered sequence of points. So we can write:
fz∗(t) =
{
0 if t = t0
ℵ0 if t0 < t ≤ t1
(2)
Notice fz∗(t) is well defined for each t in [t0, t1]. Consequently, fz∗ maps the
real interval [t0, t1] into the set of two elements {0, ℵ0}. In this way fz∗ defines
a clair dichotomy, the aleph-zero or zero dichotomy,27 regarding the numbers
of Z∗-points Achilles has traversed when moving rightward from -1 to 1 along
the X axis. Accordingly, with respect to the number of the traversed Z∗-points,
Achilles can only exhibit two states:
(1) State A0: Achilles has traversed zero Z
∗-points.
(2) State Aℵ0 : Achilles has traversed aleph-zero Z
∗-points.
Thus, Achilles directly becomes from having traversed no Z∗-point (state A0)
to having traversed ℵ0 of them (state Aℵ0). Finite intermediate states, as An
at which he would have traversed only a finite number n of Z∗-points, simply
do no exist. The set of states Achilles exhibits with respect to the number
of traversed Z-points is well defined and has only two elements, namely A0
and Aℵ0 . Let us now examine the transition from A0 to Aℵ0 under the in-
evitable restriction of the above aleph-zero or zero dichotomy. The topological
successiveness of Z∗-points makes it impossible to traverse them other than
successively. And taking into account that between any two successive Z∗-
points a finite distance greater than 0 exists, to traverse ℵ0 of those Z
∗-points
26Assuming, for instance, that v is given in kilometers per second and that the distance
from 0 to 1 is just one kilometer..
27Although the usual way of reading ℵ0 is aleph-null -it can also be read as aleph-zero-
the original English translation by P. E. B. Jourdain of Cantor’s Beitra¨ge was ”aleph-zero”.
Section 6 is entitled ”The Smallest Transfinite Cardinal Number Aleph-Zero. The current
English edition of Cantor’s Beitra¨ge is from 1955..
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-whatever they be- means to traverse a finite distance greater than 0. This
traversal, at the finite Achilles’ velocity v, can only be accomplished by lasting
a certain amount of time necessarily greater than 0. Achilles, therefore, has
to expend a certain amount of time τ > 0 in becoming Aℵ0 from A0. The
ω∗-ordering imposes this time τ has to be indeterminable, otherwise we would
know the precise instant at which Achilles becomes Aℵ0 and, consequently, we
would also know the precise Z∗-point point on which he reaches that state, and
this is impossibly because in that case we would have a natural number n such
that n + 1 = ℵ0. The indeterminacy of τ means both the existence of more
than one alternative and the impossibility to determine the actual alternative.
Now then, indeterminable as it may be, τ must be greater than 0, and this
inevitable requirement imposed by the fact that Achilles must traverse a dis-
tance greater than 0 at its finite velocity v is incompatible with the aleph-zero
or zero dichotomy, as we will immediately see.
In fact, let τ be any real number greater than zero and assume the transition
from A0 to Aℵ0 lasts a time τ . Consider the real interval (0, τ) and any instant
t ∈ (0, τ). At t Achilles state cannot be neither A0 nor Aℵ0 . It cannot be
A0 because if that were the case the process of becoming Aℵ0 would not have
begun, and then the process of becoming Aℵ0 would last a time equal or less
than τ − t in the place of the assumed τ . It cannot be Aℵ0 because in that case
the process of becoming Aℵ0 would have already finished and then it would
have lasted a time equal or less than t in the place of the assumed τ . Now then,
Achilles’ state has to be either A0 or Aℵ0 because it is well defined along the
real interval [0, 1] of which (0, τ) is a proper subinterval. Consequently, and
being τ any real number, it is impossible for Achilles to become Aℵ0 from A0 by
lasting a time greater than zero. Notice this is not a question of indeterminacy
but of impossibility: no real number greater than zero exists for the duration
of Achilles’ transition from A0 to Aℵ0 . He, therefore, has to become Aℵ0 from
A0 instantaneously. But this is impossible at his finite velocity v. He must,
therefore, remain A0. Or in other words, he cannot begin to move. Evidently,
this conclusion is the same absurdity of Zeno’s Dichotomy II, although in our
case it has been directly derived from the topological successiveness of ω∗-order,
which in turn derives from assuming the existence of complete denumerable
totalities (Axiom of infinity), as Cantor proved.28 To be complete (as the actual
infinity requires) and uncompletable (because no last -first- element completes
28[20].
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them) could be a contradictory attribute rather than a permissible eccentricity
of both ω-ordered and ω∗-ordered sequences.
The above conclusion is confirmed by the following argument.29 Let us replace
each Z∗-point with a mass Z∗-sensor capable of emitting a visible laser beam
when it is activated by any mass passing over it. Assume the system of Z∗-
sensors is regulated in such a way that each sensor emits its corresponding laser
beam if, and only if, it is activated and no other laser beam is being emitted
by other Z∗-sensor of the system. So only one laser beam can be being emitted
by the system of Z∗-sensors: the one corresponding to the first activated Z∗-
sensor, whatsoever it be. Assume Achilles performs his canonical race from
point -1 to point 1. Will any laser beam being emitted at t1? Evidently not,
because it would have to be the impossible first Z∗-sensor of an ω∗-ordered
sequence of Z∗-sensors. But on the other hand, why not? Is there any reason
to explain the inevitable malfunctioning of the Z∗-sensors system other than
the inconsistency of assuming that it is possible to begin a sequence of discrete
and successive actions without a first action to begin? What is impossible is
not motion but the actual infiniteness of ω∗-order.
Let us now examine Zeno’s Dichotomy I under the same canonical conditions
of the above Dichotomy II. Consider again the real interval [−1, 1] in the X
axis. Let now 〈zi〉i∈N be the ω-ordered sequence of Z-points:
1
2
,
3
4
,
7
8
, . . .
2i − 1
2i
, . . . (3)
Achilles has to traverse in his race from point -1 to point 1. Assume also we
remove from (0, 1) all points except just Z-points (we would have a sort of
Zeno’s powder). In the place of a continuous race from point -1 to point 1,
assume that Achilles is on point 0 just at instant t0 and then he begins to
jump to z1, to z2, to z3, . . . , and to any point x in [1, 2] if there were no other
Z-poins to jump, in such a way that he is on each zi just at ti as a consequence
of a Z-jump ji, being ti the i-th term of the ω-ordered sequence of instants
〈ti〉i∈N whose limit is tb.
29A variant of Benardete’s paradox [11].
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The one to one correspondence f(ti) = zi proves
30 that at tb Achilles has
completed the ω-ordered sequence of Z-jumps 〈ji〉i∈N on the ω-ordered sequence
of Z-points 〈zi〉i∈N. Thus, at tb Achilles has to be on a point x ≥ 1 of [1, 2].
Otherwise, if he were on a Z-point zi, only a finite number i of jumps would
have been performed. We now have an uncomfortable asymmetry between
the ω-ordered sequence of Z-jumps 〈ji〉i∈N and the (ω + 1)-ordered sequence
of points: the ω-ordered sequence of Z-points plus the last point x Achilles
ends up his ω-ordered sequence of Z-jumps, i.e. the (ω + 1)-ordered sequence
〈〈zi〉i∈N, x〉.
By definition Achilles is on each zi at ti as a consequence of the i-th Z-jump
ji. The one to one correspondence f(ji) = zi proves that:
(1) Each z-jump ji ends on a z-point zi.
(2) Consequently: No Z-jump ji makes Achilles to reach point x.
(3) Consequently: Achilles comes to point x from no Z-point.
But the only actions Achilles performs from t0 is the ω-ordered sequence of
Z-jumps 〈ji〉i∈N on the ω-ordered sequence of Z-points 〈zi〉i∈N. So, Achilles can
only come from a Z-point as a consequence of a Z-jump. How is then possible
Achilles reaches point x at tb if none of the performed Z-jumps places him
there? At this point of the discussion, most infinitists claim that although
Achilles comes to point x from no Z-point as a consequence of no Z-jump, it
reaches that point at tb as a consequence of having completed the (uncom-
pletable) ω-ordered sequence of Z-jumps 〈ji〉i∈N. As if the completion of the
ω-ordered sequence of Z-jumps 〈ji〉i∈N were a place one may come from. But
if the completion of the ω-ordered sequence of Z-jumps 〈ji〉i∈N means the com-
pletion of the ω-ordered sequence of Z-jumps 〈si〉i∈N, i.e. that each one of the
countably many Z-jumps j1, j2, j3, . . . , and only them, have been performed,
then it is quite clear that Achilles cannot reach point x at tb. Simply because
no Z-jump j1, j2, j3, . . . ends on the point x. And if no Z-jump j1, j2, j3,
. . . , end on the point x and Achilles only performs Z-jumps, then he cannot
end on point x either. On the other hand, if the completion of the ω-ordered
30This is the way infinitists pretend to explain how an ω-ordered sequence of actions can
be completed: by pairing off two endless sequences, the one of actions the other of instants
at which the successive actions are carried out. Thus, in order to end an endless sequence
of actions we only need to pair the endless sequence of actions with the endless sequence
of instants as which they are performed, as if by pairing off two impossibilities a possibility
could result..
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sequence of Z-jumps 〈ji〉i∈N were an additional jump then we would have an
(ω + 1)-ordered sequence of jumps rather that an ω-ordered one. But we have
proved the ω-ordered sequence of Z-jumps 〈ji〉i∈N suffices to place Achilles on
point x at tb. It is therefore that ω-ordered sequence 〈ji〉i∈N which places and
does not place Achilles on point x.
Achilles ends his ω-ordered sequence of Z-jumps on point x and this final
position is unexplainable because no final jump places him there. And no
final jump places him there because no final Z-jumps exists in the ω-ordered
sequence of Z-jumps 〈ji〉i∈N. The asymmetry is quite clair: there exists a last
effect (to reach point x) but not a last jump causing it. Infinitist, therefore,
have to make use of a mysterious last jump by converting the completion of an
ω-ordered sequence of jumps in a subsequent additional jump which is different
from all previously performed ones. But an ω-ordered sequence of jumps plus
an additional last jump is not an ω-ordered sequence of jumps but an (ω + 1)-
ordered one. Thus, this assumed additional jump does not solve the question,
because Achilles reaches and does not reaches point x as a consequence of an
ω-ordered (not of an (ω + 1)-ordered) sequence of jumps.
As in the case of Dichotomy II, assume that each Z-point zi is provided with a
mass Z-sensor, being the system of Z-sensors regulated in such a way that, once
a Z-sensor is activated, it will be emitting its corresponding laser beam until
other Z-sensor be activated and emits its own laser beam. In consequence,
once the system is activated there will always be a Z-beam being emitted:
the one corresponding to the last activated Z-sensor. So, once activated, it is
impossible to turn off the emission of Z-beams. Assume now Achilles performs
an ω-ordered sequence of Z-jumps on the ω-ordered sequence of Z-sensorized Z-
points. For the same reasons above, Achilles completes this ω-ordered sequence
of Z-jumps at tb. And now the question is: will any laser beam being emitted
at tb? According to the functioning of the Z-sensors system, once Achilles
activates the first Z-sensor by Z-jumping on the first Z-point, it is impossible
to turn off the emission of Z-beams. So, at tb a Z-beam has to be being emitted.
Although, on the other hand, no Z-beam can be being emitted at tb because,
if Achilles has completed his uncompletable ω-ordered sequence of Z-jumps,
that Z-beam would have to be being emitted by the impossible last Z-sensor
of the ω-ordered sequence of Z-sensors. Thus, if Achilles has completed the
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uncompletable ω-ordered sequence of Z-jumps, a laser beam will and will not
be being emitted by the system of Z-sensors. This seems rather contradictory.
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